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Abstract
Few finance theories consider the influence of ‘‘skewness’’ (or large and asymmetric but unlikely outcomes) on financial
choice. We investigated the impact of skewed gambles on subjects’ neural activity, self-reported affective responses, and
subsequent preferences using functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI). Neurally, skewed gambles elicited more
anterior insula activation than symmetric gambles equated for expected value and variance, and positively skewed gambles
also specifically elicited more nucleus accumbens (NAcc) activation than negatively skewed gambles. Affectively, positively
skewed gambles elicited more positive arousal and negatively skewed gambles elicited more negative arousal than
symmetric gambles equated for expected value and variance. Subjects also preferred positively skewed gambles more, but
negatively skewed gambles less than symmetric gambles of equal expected value. Individual differences in both NAcc
activity and positive arousal predicted preferences for positively skewed gambles. These findings support an anticipatory
affect account in which statistical properties of gambles—including skewness—can influence neural activity, affective
responses, and ultimately, choice.
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Introduction
Winning the lottery and contracting a life-threatening illness are
both life-changing but unlikely outcomes. Most people will never
experience either event, yet the profits of casinos and insurance
companies indicate that individuals are willing to pay a high
premium for the potential to win big or to cheat death. Although
traditional economic theories have little to say about how skewed
(i.e., large and asymmetric but unlikely) outcomes motivate choice,
skewed outcomes may influence not only individual fortunes but
also movements of the market [1].
An improved understanding of individuals’ responses to skewness
can inform financial theory as well as practice. Traditional economic
models assume that people seek to maximize value. For instance,
Blaise Pascal initially proposed that the expected value of an outcome
could be calculated by multiplying its magnitude with its probability.
Thus, expected value can be statistically approximated with the mean
(the first statistical moment) of repeated gamble outcomes. Current
financial models also imply that while individuals are attracted to
expected value, they are instead repelled by risk. These mean-variance
models thus approximate risk as the mathematical variance (the
second statistical moment) of repeated gamble outcomes [2].
Behavioral research, however, suggests that mean-variance models
cannot fully account for individuals’ financial choices [3]. As a result,
researchers have suggested that some choice anomalies (e.g., the lack
of diversity in investors’ portfolios) might result from preferences for
skewness (the third statistical moment) [4]. Despite behavioral
evidence that skewness can influence preferences [5,6] either by
enhancing [7] or interacting with risk [8,9], only a few models of
financial choice consider skewness. Cumulative prospect theory [10]
and rank-dependent utility models [11] have attempted to account
for skewness by overweighting unlikely extreme positive or negative
events, but do so by sacrificing the ability to explain tolerance for
variance [12].
From a psychological standpoint, statistical properties of gambles
may influence choice by altering affective states [13,14]. According to
an anticipatory affect model, statistics can influence how individuals feel
about a financial option, which can then increase or decrease their
willingness to choose that option [15]. Specifically, cues signaling
uncertain future gains elicit positive arousal and correlated neural
activity in the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) that promotes approach.
Conversely, cues signaling uncertain future losses elicit negative
arousal and correlated neural activity in the anterior insula that
promotes avoidance. The anticipatory affect model predicts that
skewed gambles might elicit distinct patterns of self-reported affect
and neural activity relative to symmetric gambles, such that positively
skewed gambles (i.e., high magnitude, low probability gains) elicit
greater positive arousal and NAcc activation, but that negatively
skewed gambles (i.e., high magnitude, low probability losses) elicit
greater negativearousal and anterior insulaactivation. These changes
in affect and correlated neural activity may lead individuals to prefer
positively skewed gambles to negatively skewed gambles.
Accumulating evidence from neuroimaging studies indicates that
expected value elicits NAcc activity [16,17], whereas expected risk
elicits anterior insula activity [18–23]. However, no studies have
controlled expected value and variance to focus on the impact of
skewness on financial choice. In the present study, nineteen subjects
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 February 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 2 | e16838participated in a gambling game while being scanned with
functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI), and subsequently
indicated their affective reactions to and preferences for each
gamble. During scanning, subjects played a series of repeated
gambles that counted for actual money (Figure 1). ‘‘Low-Variance’’
gambles yielded an equal probability (50%) of winning or losing a
small amount (6$1.00), while ‘‘High-Variance’’ gambles yielded an
equal probability (50%) of winning or losing a moderate amount
(6$2.75). ‘‘Positive-Skew’’ gambles yielded a low probability
(12.5%) of winning a large amount (+$7.00) coupled with a high
Figure 1. Gambling task. On each trial, subjects viewed a gamble cue, waited as the wheel spun, observed and reported the outcome (selecting
‘‘gain’’ or ‘‘loss’’ presented randomly on either side of the screen), and saw trial and cumulative earnings. Trials were separated by a centrally
presented fixation cross (variable inter-trial interval; 2–6 s).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016838.g001
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Skew’’ gambles conversely yielded a low probability (12.5%) of
losing a large amount (2$7.00) coupled with a high probability
(87.5%) of winning a small amount (+$1.00). Importantly, expected
value was equated across all gambles and set to $0.00 to avoid
framing effects [24], while variance was equated across High-
Variance, Positive-Skew, and Negative-Skew gambles, and skew-
ness was manipulated in opposite directions for Positive- versus
Negative-Skew gambles. Post-scan ratings of valence, arousal, and
perceived risk were collected for each gamble type. Gamble
outcome distributions ensured that all subjects received equal
exposure to all gambles and experienced identical outcomes at the
indicated probabilities before reporting their affective responses and
preferences at the end of the experiment. To assess preference,
subjects ranked their preference for the gambles and chose to play
their favorite gamble again. Thus, this research represents an initial
attempt to examine the influence of financial skewness on
anticipatory affect, neural activity, and subsequent choice.
Results
Behavior
Different gambles elicited different levels of self-reported
positive arousal, negative arousal, and perceived risk (Figure 2).
With respect to anticipatory affect, positive arousal varied, F(1,
3)=10.78, p,0.001, such that all higher variance (High-Variance,
Positive-Skew, Negative-Skew) gambles elicited more positive
arousal than Low-Variance gambles (p,0.001), and Positive-Skew
gambles elicited more positive arousal than High-Variance
(p,0.05) and Negative-Skew gambles (p,0.05). Negative arousal
also varied, F(1, 3)=14.97, p,0.001, such that all higher variance
gambles (High-Variance, Positive-Skew, Negative Skew) elicited
more negative arousal than Low-Variance gambles (p,0.001), and
Negative-Skew gambles elicited more negative arousal than High-
Variance (p,0.001) and Positive-Skew gambles (p,0.05). As with
negative arousal, subjects’ perceived risk varied, F (1, 3)=12.07,
p,0.001, such that all higher variance gambles (High-Variance,
Positive-Skew, Negative Skew) were considered riskier than Low-
Variance gambles (p,0.001), and Negative-Skew gambles were
considered riskier than both Positive-Skew (p,0.05) and High-
Variance gambles (p,0.01).
Different gambles also elicited different preference rankings,
F(1, 3)=11.17, p,0.001, such that subjects preferred High-
Variance to Low-Variance gambles (p,0.01), and preferred all
other gambles to Negative-Skew gambles (p,0.01). Nonparamet-
ric analyses of rankings yielded similar results. Comparison of
High-Variance versus Low-Variance gamble rankings using a
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test confirmed that subjects preferred
Figure 2. Behavioral data. Low-Variance (LV), High-Variance (HV), Positive-Skew (PS), Negative-Skew (NS) gambles. * p,0.05; ** p,0.01;
*** p,0.001 differences between higher variance gambles. Lines represent standard errors of the mean. A. Negative arousal. B. Positive arousal. C.
Risk. D. Preference.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016838.g002
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Contrasts of Positive-Skew and Negative-Skew gamble preferences
revealed that subjects preferred Positive-Skew to Negative-Skew
gambles (Z=2.59, p,0.01) and High-Variance to Negative-Skew
gambles (Z=3.68, p,0.001). Subjects were indifferent between
the two highest-ranked gambles (i.e., High-Variance and Positive-
Skew; Z=1.20, n.s.).
Brain Activation
Whole-brain analyses revealed that anticipatory activation (i.e.,
the first 4 s of each trial) in predicted regions differed in response
to variance and skewness (at a whole-brain corrected threshold of
p,0.05) (Table S1). High variance versus low variance gambles
(i.e., the contrast of High-Variance + Positive-Skew + Negative-
Skew . Low-Variance) elicited increased activation in the anterior
insula. Among high variance gambles, skewed versus symmetric
gambles (i.e., the contrast of Positive-Skew + Negative-Skew .
High-Variance) elicited even greater activation in the anterior
insula (Figure 3). Among skewed gambles, positively versus
negatively skewed gambles (i.e., the contrast of Positive-Skew .
Negative-Skew) elicited greater bilateral NAcc activation, but at a
targeted (a priori small volume-corrected) threshold (TC: 612, 11,
21; Z=2.30, p,0.05), which was further verified with timecourse
analyses. Beyond group differences, individual difference analyses
also indicated a link between NAcc activation and preference for
Positive-Skew gambles (described below).
Activation timecourses were extracted from predefined ana-
tomical NAcc and anterior insula volumes of interest (VOI) to
verify neural responses to the gambles indicated by the whole-
brain analyses (Figure 3 and Figure 4). Repeated-measures
ANOVAs revealed significant main effects of gamble type in
anterior insula (F=12.03, df=3, p,0.001) and NAcc (F=5.03,
df=3,p,0.05) activation during anticipation. Post-hoc t-tests (one-
tailed) confirmed significant pairwise differences, such that both
Positive- and Negative-Skew gambles elicited more anterior insula
activation than High-Variance (p,0.001; p,0.05) and Low-
Variance gambles (p,0.001; p,0.001); while Positive-Skew
gambles elicited more NAcc activation than Low-Variance
(p,0.01), High-Variance (p,0.05), and Negative-Skew gambles
(p,0.05).
Consistent with previous findings indicating that NAcc
activation correlates with positive arousal [25], NAcc activation
selectively increased for Positive-Skew gambles. Anterior insula
activation, however, increased for both Positive- and Negative-
Skew gambles. Since previous research indicates that brain
activation outside the context of choice can predict preference
[26,27], we examined whether individual differences in NAcc
activation and anticipatory affect could account for subsequent
preferences for Positive-Skew gambles. Regression models exam-
ined whether peak brain activation alone, anticipatory affect
alone, and a combination of both could account for individual
differences in preferences for Positive-Skew gambles. Both NAcc
activation (R
2=0.27, p,0.05) and positive arousal (R
2=0.59,
p,0.001) separately predicted preference. Combining both
measures significantly improved the explanatory power of the
model to account for individual differences in preference for
Positive-Skew gambles (R
2=0.84, p,0.001). Specifically, includ-
ing neural (NAcc) activation explained additional variance over
and above reported positive arousal (DR
2=0.12, p,0.05).
Anterior insula activation and reported negative arousal, however,
were not significant predictors of preference for Positive-Skew
gambles in this model (R
2=0.01, n.s.; R
2=0.13, n.s.).
Discussion
The present study examined how financial skewness influences
neural activity, affect, and choice. Although previous behavioral
research has explored preferences for skewness [28,29], we
Figure 3. Skewness increases Anterior Insula activation. A. Skewed versus Symmetric; p,0.001 uncorrected, p,0.05 whole-brain corrected.
(Table S1). B. Time courses extracted from anterior insula for gambles (*Positive- and Negative-Skew vs. Low- and High-Variance, p,0.05). Lines
represent standard errors of the mean. The white bar highlights the anticipatory period (shifted by 6 s to account for the hemodynamic lag).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016838.g003
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anticipated the outcomes of skewed gambles. Beyond expected
value and variance, skewness differentially elicited affect, such that
positively skewed gambles increased positive arousal, but nega-
tively skewed gambles increased negative arousal and perceived
risk. Subjects also preferred positively skewed and high variance
gambles to negatively skewed gambles.
These behavioral findings demonstrate that skewness influences
choice in a way not accounted for by normative economic or
financial models. Expected value and mean-variance approaches do not
predict preference for variance and positive skewness. Further,
prospect theory [30] also does not predict preference for variance,
because loss aversion implies aversion to variance. The presently
observed preference for variance is consistent with other studies of
risky choice [31,32], but further research is needed to determine
when increasing the magnitude of monetary outcomes induces
aversion to variance. Above and beyond variance, though,
skewness elicited affect (indexed by positive and negative arousal)
that may have promoted subsequent approach to positively skewed
gambles and avoidance of negatively skewed gambles.
Previous neuroimaging studies of financial risk-taking have not
systematically investigated skewness. The current findings repre-
sent a logical but novel extension of a growing neuroimaging
literature examining the influence of statistical moments on choice
[33,34]. Critically, even after holding expected value and variance
constant, skewed gambles elicited increased anterior insula
activation. Positive skewness additionally increased NAcc activa-
tion. Further, individual differences in both positive arousal ratings
and NAcc activation predicted subsequent preference for posi-
tively skewed gambles. Together, these findings imply that the
impact of positive versus negative skewness may not be localized to
a single brain region. Rather, skewness may act through distinct
neural circuits previously implicated in anticipatory affect to
influence preferences.
To systematically manipulate skewness (while holding expected
value and variance constant), we used mixed gambles with an
expected value of zero. Since investigators have observed
differences in the attractiveness of gambles with positive and
negative expected values [24], future studies that shift gambles’
expected value into either gain or loss domains may determine
whether behavioral and neural responses to skewness remain
constant under different value frames. To collect sufficient
repeated measurements for stable FMRI assessment, we examined
a limited set of four gambles. Future research exploring parametric
manipulations of skewness may further establish the generalizabil-
ity of skewness preferences. To control for order and learning
effects by ensuring that subjects had identical experiences, all
gambles were initially presented and evaluated passively (i.e., in
the absence of active choice). Although many previous neuroim-
aging studies of financial decision-making have similarly controlled
expected value when manipulating risk-related variables (e.g.,
variance), the present findings imply that researchers might
consider also controlling for skewness.
Together, these findings provide initial neural and behavioral
evidence for an independent influence of skewness on financial
preferences. At both group and individual levels of analysis,
skewness elicited affect and neural activity that predicts future
choice. Contrary to normative models that specify that higher-
order moments (e.g., skewness) should influence decisions less than
lower-order moments (e.g., mean, variance), these findings suggest
that skewness has a disproportionately large impact on reported
affective experience, neural activity, and choice. Eventually, choice
may be best modeled instead by a flexible multi-attribute
framework that incorporates the affective impact of gambles [35].
Because people are willing to pay a premium for positively
skewed financial investments and receive a premium for
shouldering negatively skewed investments [36], skewness prefer-
ences may generalize to the real world, and even influence market
valuation at the aggregate level [37]. An improved understanding
of how skewness preferences influence financial decision-making
holds potential relevance not only to individuals who purchase
lottery tickets or insurance, but also to societal reactions to
improbable financial events – and by extension, to economic
policy. Broadly, these findings support a dynamic and componen-
tial neuroeconomic account that may eventually connect statistical
experience to affect, and ultimately, choice.
Figure 4. NAcc activation predicts Positive-Skew preference. A. Timecourses extracted from NAcc for different gambles (*Positive-Skew vs.
Low-Variance, High-Variance and Negative-Skew, p,0.05). Lines represent standard errors of the mean. The white bar highlights the anticipatory
period (shifted by 6 s to account for the hemodynamic lag). B. NAcc percent signal change plotted with preference for Positive-Skew gambles
(r=0.53, p,0.01).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016838.g004
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Subjects
Nineteen healthy native English-speaking adults (nine females;
right-handed, mean age 22.063.28 SD) participated in the study.
Subjects had no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders.
Written informed consent was obtained from all subjects, under a
protocol approved by the Institutional Review Board of the
Stanford University School of Medicine. In addition to the 19
subjects included in the analysis, two were excluded for excessive
head motion (i.e., greater than 2 mm from one whole-brain
acquisition to the next) and two more were excluded for not
complying with experimental instructions. In addition to a flat fee
of $40.00 for two hours of participation and a $25.00 endowment,
subjects’ payments were determined by the outcomes during the
gambling task as well the outcome of their chosen gamble at the
end of the experiment (M=$66.006 SD $3.00).
Behavioral Task and Analysis
Subjects received spoken and written instructions and complet-
ed a brief training session prior to the first experimental run in the
scanner. In the gambling task, subjects played a series of repeated
gambles that counted for real money. On each trial, subjects
viewed the gamble (2 s), followed by a spinning wheel (2 s), and
the outcome highlighted in yellow (2 s). They then pressed a
button to verify the gamble outcome (2 s), and observed the
cumulative total for the run (2 s). Presentation of all gambles and
response prompts were counterbalanced on both right and left
sides of the screen. To ensure a high response rate, failures to
respond within 2 seconds resulted in an automatic loss of $0.10 in
addition to the gamble outcome for that trial (i.e., a win of $1.00
would result in +$0.90 and a loss of $1.00 would result in 2$1.10),
consistent with methods of previous studies [21,23,38]. Trials were
separated by brief but variable inter-trial intervals (2–6 s). The
gambling task consisted of 196 total trials, during which all
gambles were evaluated according to their probabilistic outcomes.
Thus, this passive gambling task was designed to ensure that all
subjects played the same gambles an equal number of times and
experienced identical outcomes.
After completing the gambling task in the scanner, subjects rated
their affective responses as they anticipated each of the gamble
outcomes. Previous studies have demonstrated high concordance
and reliability between online anticipatory and cued retrospective
affective ratings [39]. Ratings indexed affective arousal and valence,
as well as perceived risk during the anticipation phase of each
gamble (first 4 seconds ofa trial).Allthree ratings used a seven-point
Likert scale, with left and right buttons indicating a continuum
ranging from ‘‘not at all aroused’’ to ‘‘very aroused’’ for arousal,
‘‘very negative’’ to ‘‘very positive’’ for valence, and ‘‘not risky at all’’
to ‘‘very risky’’ for perceived risk. Ratings of gamble-elicited arousal
and valence were mean-deviated within subject and plotted within a
Euclidean two-dimensional space. These dimensions were then
rotated by 45 degrees to derive measures of positive arousal (PA)
[i.e., PA = arousal/sqrt(2) + valence/sqrt(2)] and negative arousal
(NA) [NA = arousal/sqrt(2) – valence/sqrt(2)] [16,40]. Subjective
ratings ofgambleswereanalyzed withrepeated-measuresanalysis of
variance (ANOVA), after which significant main effects were
submitted to post-hoc pairwise t-tests to verify significant differences
between gamble types, using SPSS 16.0.
fMRI Acquisition and Analysis
Images were acquired with a 1.5T General Electric MRI
scanner (General Electric, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA) and a
standard quadrature head coil. Twenty-four contiguous axial 4-
mm-thick slices (in-plane resolution 3.7563.75 mm) extended
axially from the mid-pons to the top of the skull. Functional scans
were acquired with a T2*-sensitive spiral in/out pulse sequence
(repetition time=2 s, echo time=40 ms, flip=90 degrees) [41].
High resolution structural scans for localization and coregistration
of functional data were acquired with a T1-weighted spoiled grass
sequences (repetition time=100 ms, echo time=7 ms, flip=90
degrees).
Analyses of neural data utilized AFNI software (National
Institute of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, USA) [42]. For
preprocessing, data were sinc-interpolated to correct for nonsi-
multaneous slice acquisition, corrected for three-dimensional
motion, high-pass filtered to remove slow trends (.0.01 Hz),
and normalized to percent signal change relative to the voxel
mean across the task. Visual inspection of motion correction
estimates confirmed that no subject’s head moved more than
2 mm in any dimension from one volume acquisition to the next.
Analyses proceeded through three stages: whole-brain localiza-
tion, volume of interest (VOI) time course verification, and
individual difference regressions. Localization analyses utilized a
multiple regression model that included independent (i.e.,
uncorrelated) regressors modeling anticipation of gamble out-
comes: (i) high versus low variance, (ii) skewed versus symmetric,
and (iii) positive versus negative skew. The model also included
regressors of noninterest indexing residual motion (n=6) and
anticipation versus the rest of the trial (n=1, unit-weighted). Maps
of contrast coefficients for regressors of interest were coregistered
with structural maps, spatially normalized by manually warping to
Talaraich space, spatially smoothed to minimize effects of
anatomic variability (FWHM=4 mm), and collectively submitted
to a one-sample t-test against the null hypothesis of no activation
in order to test for group differences while controlling for random
effects. The threshold for statistically significant foci activation in
group maps was set at p,0.001 with a cluster of 16 contiguous
2.00 mm cubic voxels (i.e., minimum cluster criterion for p,0.05
whole-brain corrected threshold specified by AFNI’s AlphaSim)
[42].
Foractivationtime courseanalyses,VOIs were specifiedas8 mm
diameter spheres centered on previously identified foci (NAcc, TC:
611, 12, 21; anterior insula, TC: 631, 23, 6) and confirmed by
localization analyses. Activation time courses were spatially
averaged within each VOI and then divided by the average
activation over the course of the entire experiment to derive
measures of percent signal change. To separately examine the
influence of each gamble on activation in each region, VOI time
courseswere averaged into fourconditionsrepresentingeachtype of
gamble (i.e., Low-Variance, High-Variance, Negative-Skew, and
Positive-Skew). VOI peak activations during the anticipatory period
(lagged by 6 s to match the hemodynamic peak) were submitted to
repeated-measures ANOVA. VOI peak activations from regions
showing significant main effects were then submitted to post-hoc
pairwise t-tests to verify differences between types of gambles.
For individual differences analyses, timecourse data during
anticipation of Positive-Skew gambles were extracted from the
NAcc and anterior insula for each individual. Regression analyses
examined whether individual differences in peak neural activation
during anticipation as well as cue-induced affect predicted
subsequent preference for Positive-Skew gambles.
Supporting Information
Table S1 Regressors of interest Z-scores and Talaraich
coordinates for peak activation foci. Variance contrast
compared high variance versus low variance gambles (High-
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Skewness contrast compared skewed versus symmetric gambles of
equal variance (Positive-Skew + Negative-Skew . High-Variance).
Positive Skewness contrast compared positively skewed versus
negatively skewed gambles (Positive-Skew . Negative-Skew).
Regions surpassed threshold of Z.3.28 (p,0.001, uncorrected;
p,0.05, whole-brain corrected; * p,0.05, small-volume corrected).
(DOC)
Acknowledgments
We thank the SPAN lab for feedback on earlier versions of the manuscript.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: CCW PB BK. Performed the
experiments: CCW. Analyzed the data: CCW BK. Wrote the paper: CCW
PB BK.
References
1. Patton A (2004) On the out-of-sample importance of skewness and asymmetric
dependence for asset allocation. Journal of Financial Econometrics 2: 130–168.
2. Markowitz H (1952) Portfolio Selection. Journal of Finance 7: 77–91.
3. Edwards W (1954) Variance preferences in gambling. The American Journal of
Psychology 67: 441–452.
4. Mitton T, Vorkink K (2007) Equilibrium Underdiversification and the
Preference for Skewness. Review of Financial Studies 20: 1255–1288.
5. Coombs C, Lehner P (1981) Evaluation of two alternative models for a theory of
risk: I. Are moments of distributions useful in assessing risk? Journal of
Experimental Psychology 7: 1110–1123.
6. Kraus A, Litzenberger R (1976) Skewness preference and the valuation of risk
assets. Journal of Finance 31: 1085–1100.
7. Menezes C, Geiss C, Tressler J (1980) Increasing Downside Risk. American
Economic Review 70: 921–932.
8. Alderfer C, Bierman H (1970) Choices with Risk: Beyond the Mean and
Variance. Journal of Business 43: 341–353.
9. Chiu W (2005) Skewness Preference, Risk Aversion, and the Precedence
Relations on Stochastic Changes. Management Science 51: 1816–1828.
10. Tversky A, Kahneman D (1992) Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative
representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5: 297–323.
11. Quiggin J (1982) A theory of anticipated utility. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization 3: 323–343.
12. Levy H, Levy M (2004) Prospect theory and mean-variance analysis. Review of
Financial Studies 17: 1015–1041.
13. Slovic P, Finucane M, Peters E, Macgregor D (2007) The affect heuristic.
European Journal of Operational Research 177: 1333–1352.
14. Loewenstein G, Hsee C, Weber E, Welch N (2001) Risk as Feelings.
Psychological Bulletin 127: 267–286.
15. Knutson B, Greer S (2008) Review. Anticipatory affect: neural correlates and
consequences for choice. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B:
Biological Sciences 363: 3771–3786.
16. Knutson B, Taylor J, Kaufman M, Peterson R, Glover G (2005) Distributed
Neural Representation of Expected Value. Journal of Neuroscience 25:
4806–4812.
17. Yacubian J, Glascher J, Schroeder K, Sommer T (2006) Dissociable Systems for
Gain-and Loss-Related Value Predictions and Errors of Prediction in the
Human Brain. Journal of Neuroscience 26: 9530–9537.
18. Kuhnen C, Knutson B (2005) The neural basis of financial risk taking. Neuron
47: 763–770.
19. Liu X, Powell D, Wang H, Gold B, Corbly C (2007) Functional Dissociation in
Frontal and Striatal Areas for Processing of Positive and Negative Reward
Information. Journal of Neuroscience 27: 4587–4597.
20. Paulus M, Rogalsky C, Simmons A, Feinstein J (2003) Increased activation in the
right insula during risk-taking decision making is related to harm avoidance and
neuroticism. Neuroimage 19: 1439–1448.
21. Huettel S, Stowe C, Gordon E, Warner B (2006) Neural Signatures of Economic
Preferences for Risk and Ambiguity. Neuron 49: 765–775.
22. Preuschoff K, Bossaerts P, Quartz S (2006) Neural differentiation of expected
reward and risk in human subcortical structures. Neuron 51: 381–390.
23. Preuschoff K, Quartz S, Bossaerts P (2008) Human Insula Activation Reflects
Risk Prediction Errors As Well As Risk. Journal of Neuroscience 28: 2745–2752.
24. Lovallo D, Kahneman D (2000) Living with Uncertainty: Attractiveness and
Resolution Timing. Journal of Behavioral Decision-Making 13: 179–190.
25. Knutson B, Adams C, Fong G, Hommer D (2001) Anticipation of Increasing
Monetary Reward Selectively Recruits Nucleus Accumbens. Journal of
Neuroscience 21: RC159.
26. Knutson B, Rick S, Wimmer G, Prelec D, Loewenstein G (2007) Neural
predictors of purchases. Neuron 53: 147–156.
27. Smith D, Hayden B, Truong T, Song A, Platt M, et al. (2010) Distinct value
signals in anterior and posterior ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Journal of
Neuroscience 30: 2490–2495.
28. Edwards W (1953) Probability-preferences in gambling. The American Journal
of Psychology 66: 349–364.
29. Coombs C, Pruitt D (1960) Components of risk in decision making: Probability
and variance preferences. Journal of Experimental Psychology 60: 265–277.
30. Kahneman D, Tversky A (1979) Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under
risk. Econometrica 47: 263–292.
31. Gneezy U, Kapteyn A, Potters J (2003) Evaluation periods and asset prices in a
market experiment. The Journal of Finance 58: 821–837.
32. Tobler P, Christopoulos G, O’ Dougherty J, Dolan R, Schultz W (2009) Risk-
dependent reward value signal in human prefrontal cortex. Proc Natl Acad
Sci U S A 106: 7185–7190.
33. Knutson B, Bossaerts P (2007) Neural Antecedents of Financial Decisions.
Journal of Neuroscience 27: 8174–8177.
34. Symmonds M, Bossaerts P, Dolan R (2010) A Behavioral and Neural Evaluation
of Prospective Decision-Making under Risk. Journal of Neuroscience 30:
14380–14389.
35. Miyamoto J, Wakker P (1996) Multiattribute utility theory without expected
utility foundations. Operations Research 44: 313–326.
36. Ang A, Chen J, Xing Y (2005) Downside Risk. Review of Financial Studies 19:
1191–1239.
37. Arditti F, Levy H (1975) Portfolio efficiency analysis in three moments: the
multiperiod case. Journal of Finance 30: 797–809.
38. Breiter H, Aharon I, Kahneman D, Dale A (2001) Functional Imaging of Neural
Responses to Expectancy and Experience of Monetary Gains and Losses.
Neuron 30: 619–639.
39. Nielsen L, Knutson B, Carstensen LL (2008) Affect dynamics, affective
forecasting, and aging. Emotion 8: 318–330.
40. Watson D, Wiese D, Vaidya J, Tellegen A (1999) The two general activation
systems of affect: Structural findings, evolutionary considerations, and
psychobiological evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76:
820–838.
41. Glover G, Law C (2001) Spiral-in/out BOLD fMRI for increased SNR and
reduced susceptibility artifacts. Magnetic Resonance in Medicine 46: 515–522.
42. Cox R (1996) AFNI: software for analysis and visualization of functional
magnetic resonance neuroimages. Computers and Biomedical Research 29:
162–173.
Affective Impact of Financial Skewness
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 February 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 2 | e16838